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Attempts to amend constitutions so as to make legal1 marriage 
impossible for same-sex couples are futile. Amendments of this kind are 
nothing more than temporary “legal dikes” designed to create “legal 
islands” in which a heterosexual majority can continue to discriminate 
against a lesbian and gay minority in relation to access to legal marriage. 
These amendments seek to strip the gay and lesbian minority of any 
possibility of seeking protection against such discrimination from either 
the legislature or the courts. Where such amendments have been adopted, 
they will eventually be repealed or invalidated, because the “incoming 
tide,” i.e., the long-term international trend, will eventually bring full 
legal equality to our fellow human beings who happen to be lesbian and 
gay individuals, or members of same-sex couples, with or without 
children. 
The first part of my handout2 illustrates two international trends 
regarding equal access to legal marriage for same-sex couples. What I 
call “International Trend No. 1” is “treating sexual orientation as a 
suspect (or quasi-suspect) classification,” i.e., a classification that is 
presumed unconstitutional and requires a strong justification when used 
by a government. This is something that has been avoided by U.S. courts 
in recent decisions such as Romer v. Evans,3 Baker v. State of Vermont,4 
Lawrence v. Texas,5 and Goodridge v. Department of Public Health6. In 
 ∗ B.A. (Alberta), LL.B., B.C.L. (McGill), D.Phil. (Oxford). Member of New York Bar 
(Associate, Milbank Tweed, 1982-87). Professor of Human Rights Law, School of Law, King’s 
College, University of London, England, United Kingdom. This is a revised version of a presentation 
given at the Federal Marriage Amendment Symposium held at Brigham Young University on 
September 9, 2005. 
 1. I will refer to “legal marriage” (a marriage with legal but not religious consequences) and 
“religious marriage” (a marriage with religious but not legal consequences), but not “civil marriage” 
(a marriage performed by a state official with legal but nor religious consequences). In some 
European countries, like the Netherlands, Belgium and France, “civil marriage” and “legal marriage” 
are synonymous, because a religious marriage can never be a legal marriage (have legal 
consequences). This is not true in the United Kingdom, Canada and the United States, where a 
marriage performed by a religious official (eg, in a Christian church) can be simultaneously a legal 
marriage and a religious marriage. 
 2. The first part of the handout follows this transcript as Appendix A. 
 3. 517 U.S. 620 (1996).
 4. 744 A.2d 864 (Vt. 1999). 
 5. 539 U.S. 558 (2003). 
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all of these decisions, the courts have used a powerful form of rational 
basis review, and thus avoided the real question: whether or not 
classifications (differences in treatment) based on sexual orientation 
should be treated in the same way as classifications based on race, 
religion or sex. The debate is ongoing, certainly at the federal level in the 
United States, and most state supreme courts also seem to have managed 
to avoid answering this question. 
International Trend No. 1 is to treat sexual orientation as similar to 
race, religion and sex, and therefore to require the same level of scrutiny 
for claims of discrimination based on sexual orientation as for claims of 
discrimination based on race, religion or sex. This trend manifests itself 
in two ways. First, since 1989, when a new constitutional bill of rights is 
being drafted, it is increasingly common to insert sexual orientation into 
the list7 of presumptively prohibited grounds in the provision that 
prohibits discrimination. In the handout, you will see a list of the 
constitutions of nation-states,8 or of constituent states within a federal 
system,9 that mention sexual orientation in their lists of such grounds. 
The best known and most influential of these provisions is the one in the 
South African Constitution, because South Africa is a country where the 
majority of people know what discrimination means, having suffered 
racial discrimination for decades.10 The first example at the international 
level is Article 21(1) of the Charter of Fundamental Rights of the 
European Union,11 which builds on Article 13 of the European 
Community Treaty.12 Although the Charter is only a political 
 6. 798 N.E.2d 941 (Mass. 2003). 
 7. Although the 14th Amendment to the U.S. Constitution contains no list of grounds (and 
does not even mention race), most other national constitutions and international human rights treaties 
contain such a list. 
 8. See CONSTITUTION OF THE REPUBLIC OF SOUTH AFRICA ACT (No. 200 of 1993) § 8(2); 
CONSTITUTION OF THE REPUBLIC OF SOUTH AFRICA ACT (No. 108 of 1996) § 9(3); FIJI ISLANDS, 
CONSTITUTION AMENDMENT ACT 1997 § 38(2)(a); ECUADOR CONST. art. XXIII, § 3 (1998); 
PORTUGAL CONST. art. XIII, § 2 (as amended in 2004). 
 9. Brazil, States of MATO GROSSO CONST. art. X, § 3 (1989), and SERGIPE CONST. art. III, § 
2 (1989); Germany, States of BRANDENBURG CONST. art. XII, § 2 (1992); THURINGIA CONST. art. II, 
§ 3 (1993); BERLIN CONST. art. X, § 2 (1995). 
 10. “The state may not unfairly discriminate directly or indirectly against anyone on one or 
more grounds, including race, gender, sex, pregnancy, marital status, ethnic or social origin, colour, 
sexual orientation, age, disability, religion, conscience, belief, culture, language and birth.” S. AFR. 
CONST. 1996 § 9(3) (emphasis added). 
 11. Charter of Fundamental Rights of the European Union art. XXI § 1 (EC 2000), available 
at http://europa.eu.int/eur-lex/pri/en/oj/dat/2000/c_364/c_36420001218en00010022.pdf (last visited 
May 8, 2006). 
 12. See http://europa.eu.int/eur-lex/lex/en/treaties/index.htm (last visited May 8, 2006). 
Added in 1997, Article 13 does not itself prohibit discrimination, but gives the European Community 
legislature clear power to “take appropriate action to combat discrimination based on sex, racial or 
ethnic origin, religion or belief, disability, age or sexual orientation” (emphasis added). 
  
527] SAME-SEX MARRIAGE IN UTAH? 529 
 
proclamation that is not yet legally binding,13 its Article 21(1) was 
intended to be a “state of the art” anti-discrimination provision for the 
21st century, by including grounds of discrimination that have only been 
recognized recently such as disability, age, sexual orientation, and 
genetic features (a ground that could become more significant in the 
future).14
The second way in which International Trend No. 1 manifests itself 
is through judicial interpretation of existing anti-discrimination 
provisions of national constitutions or international human rights treaties, 
which do not expressly mention sexual orientation. Often, these 
provisions were drafted long before anyone was talking about sexual 
orientation, and are difficult to amend. Yet, there is a trend towards 
acknowledging that sexual orientation is one of the grounds that is 
deserving of heightened scrutiny under such provisions. The Supreme 
Court of Canada reached that conclusion unanimously in 1995.15 The 
European Court of Human Rights, in a series of decisions, has made 
express or implied analogies between sexual orientation and race, 
religion or sex,16 and the United Nations Human Rights Committee has 
 13. Article II-81(1) of the Treaty establishing a Constitution for Europe (signed on 29 Oct. 
2004) is identical to Article XXI(1) of the Charter, and would become legally binding if the Treaty 
were ratified by all 25 European Union member states (the ratification process has been stalled due 
to negative referendum results in France and the Netherlands in 2005). 
 14. “Any discrimination based on any ground such as sex, race, colour, ethnic or social 
origin, genetic features, language, religion or belief, political or any other opinion, membership of a 
national minority, property, birth, disability, age or sexual orientation shall be prohibited.” Charter 
of Fundamental Rights of the European Union art. XXI § I (emphasis added). 
 15. See Egan v. Canada, [1995] 2 S.C.R. 513, ¶ 5, 173-175 (the Court held by 9 votes to 0 
that, under Section 15(1) of the Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms, part of the federal 
Constitution of Canada, sexual orientation is an “analogous ground” of discrimination, analogous to 
the “enumerated grounds”: race, national or ethnic origin, colour, religion, sex, age or mental or 
physical disability). The Court held by 5 votes to 4 that providing a social security benefit to 
unmarried different-sex couples but not to unmarried same-sex couples was prima facie 
discrimination based on sexual orientation that the federal government had to justify, and by 5 votes 
to 4 (one judge having switched sides), that the discrimination could be justified. See Robert 
Wintemute, “Discrimination Against Same-Sex Couples: Sections 15(1) and 1 of the Charter: Egan 
v. Canada,” (1995) 74 Canadian Bar Review 682-713. The Court implicitly overruled the result in 
Egan (by 8 votes to 1) in M. v. H., [1999] 2 S.C.R. 3.
 16. See Smith & Grady v. United Kingdom, 29 Eur. Ct. H.R. 493, ¶ 97 (1999) (stating that 
“[t]o the extent that they represent a predisposed bias on the part of a heterosexual majority against a 
homosexual minority, these negative attitudes [of heterosexual members of the armed forces] cannot, 
of themselves, be considered by the Court to amount to sufficient justification for the interferences 
with the [lesbian and gay members’] rights . . . any more than similar negative attitudes towards 
those of a different race, origin or colour” (emphasis added)); Mouta v. Portugal, Eur. Ct. H.R. 
Application no. 33290/96, ¶ 36 (Dec. 21, 1999) (“the [Lisbon] Court of Appeal [by transferring 
custody of a child from her gay father to her heterosexual mother] made a distinction based on 
considerations regarding the applicant’s sexual orientation, a distinction which is not acceptable 
under the [European] Convention [on Human Rights] [like distinctions based on religion] (see, 
mutatis mutandis, . . . Hoffmann . . . [Jehovah’s Witness mother])”); S.L. v. Austria, Eur. Ct. H.R., ¶ 
37 (2003) (“[T]he Court reiterates that sexual orientation is a concept covered by Article 14 [the 
  
530 BYU JOURNAL OF PUBLIC LAW [Volume 20 
 
recently interpreted the anti-discrimination provision that it is responsible 
for enforcing as including sexual orientation.17 Time does not permit me 
to discuss the analogies between sexual orientation and race, religion or 
sex. However, if you turn to my egocentric reading list (page ten of the 
handout), which cites only my own publications,18 you will find the 
published book version of my doctoral thesis, Sexual Orientation and 
Human Rights, which analyzes these analogies at length.19 Sexual 
orientation can be compared to race because many lesbian and gay 
people would say that their emotional and sexual attractions to persons of 
the same sex are immutable: they did not choose these internal feelings 
and have no control over them, just as people cannot choose their race. 
Acting on those feelings (by engaging in same-sex sexual activity or 
establishing a long-term couple relationship) brings in a voluntary 
element, which makes sexual orientation similar to religion – a 
fundamental choice that should be respected in the same way that 
religious practices are respected. Finally, in the case of sex, the argument 
is not that sexual orientation is “like” sex (other than in the sense that the 
feelings related to sexual orientation are immutable), but that sexual 
orientation discrimination is generally also sex discrimination, even 
when it relates to chosen conduct. If most cases of sexual orientation 
discrimination are analyzed correctly, it can be seen that they are 
simultaneously cases of sex discrimination, because a rule is telling 
people that how they are permitted to live their lives depends on the sex 
chromosomes with which they were born.20
‘equal protection clause’ of the European Convention] . . . Just like differences [in treatment] based 
on sex [emphasis added], . . . differences [in treatment] based on sexual orientation require 
particularly serious reasons by way of justification . . .”). 
 17. See Young v. Australia (Communication No. 941/2000), United Nations Human Rights 
Committee, 6 Aug. 2003, ¶ 10.4, available at 
http://www.unhchr.ch/tbs/doc.nsf/385c2add1632f4a8c12565a9004dc311/3c839cb2ae3bef6fc1256da
c002b3034?OpenDocument (“[T]he prohibition against discrimination under article 26 [of the 
International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, ratified by the USA in 1992] comprises also 
discrimination based on sexual orientation.”). 
 18. See, e.g., ROBERT WINTEMUTE, From “Love Rights” to “Sex Rights”: Partnership 
Rights as Human Rights, in SEX RIGHTS (Nicholas Bamforth ed., Oxford University Press 2005); 
ROBERT WINTEMUTE, Sexual Orientation and Gender Identity, in HUMAN RIGHTS IN THE 
COMMUNITY (Colin Harvey ed., Oxford: Hart Publishing 2005); ROBERT WINTEMUTE, Strasbourg 
to the Rescue? Same-Sex Partners and Parents Under the European Convention, in LEGAL 
RECOGNITION OF SAME-SEX PARTNERSHIPS: A STUDY OF NATIONAL, EUROPEAN AND 
INTERNATIONAL LAW (Robert Wintemute ed., Oxford, Hart Publishing, 2001). 
 19. ROBERT WINTEMUTE, SEXUAL ORIENTATION AND HUMAN RIGHTS: THE UNITED STATES 
CONSTITUTION, THE EUROPEAN CONVENTION, AND THE CANADIAN CHARTER (Oxford University 
Press 1997). 
 20. Robert Wintemute, Recognising New Kinds of Direct Sex Discrimination: 
Transsexualism, Sexual Orientation and Dress Codes, 60 MOD. L. REV. 334 (1997); Robert 
Wintemute, Sex Discrimination in MacDonald and Pearce: Why the Law Lords Chose the Wrong 
Comparators, 14 KING’S C. L.J. 267 (2003). 
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International Trend No. 2 is the gradual, historical trend towards the 
elimination of all public-sector sexual orientation discrimination, and the 
prohibition of many forms of private-sector sexual orientation 
discrimination. International Trend No. 2 is merely the application, to 
specific areas of law or life, of the principle that results from 
International Trend No. 1: all sexual orientation discrimination is 
presumptively a violation of national constitutional rights or international 
human rights, and requires a strong justification. The typical steps in the 
elimination of sexual orientation discrimination are: (1) repeal of the 
death penalty for some or all forms of sexual activity between men or 
between women; (2) repeal of all criminal prohibitions of private, adult, 
consensual, same-sex sexual activity, which means that lesbian women 
and gay men can no longer be considered as criminals; (3) passage of 
legislation prohibiting sexual orientation discrimination in public and 
private employment or services, which means that lesbian women and 
gay men are viewed as equal citizens and entitled, as individuals (but not 
as members of same-sex couples), to equal opportunities in society; and 
(4) provision of equal rights to same-sex couples, including equal access 
to legal marriage and joint or second-parent adoption of children. 
With regard to step (1), one example was Connecticut Colony’s 1642 
statute, apparently plagiarized from Leviticus,21 which authorized the 
death penalty for male-male anal intercourse: “If any man lyeth with 
mankind as hee lyeth with woman, both of them have committed 
abomination, they both shall surely be put to death.”22 In the 21st 
century, as a small but growing number of countries permit same-sex 
couples to contract legal marriages, it is important to remember that the 
death penalty was the starting point for legal reforms in relation to same-
sex couples. This allows us to appreciate how far they have come. As 
recently as 1860 in England, Wales and Ireland (1888 in Scotland), two 
men living together as a couple and having a sexual relationship risked 
execution by hanging.23 That was the respect that was accorded to same-
sex couples by British law in the 19th century. 
Fortunately, we’ve moved on from there. I trust that no one in this 
room would say, “Bring back the death penalty because Leviticus 
requires it!” Leviticus, for me, as a human rights lawyer, is a nightmare, 
 21. Leviticus 20:13 (King James). 
 22. Quoted in the exhibition “The Pink and the Blue: Lesbian and Gay Life at Yale and in 
Connecticut, 1642-2004,” Sterling Library, Yale University (2004) (Jonathan Ned Katz, curator). 
The exhibition noted that William Plaine was executed in New Haven in 1646 for “sodomy.” The 
crime was extended to female-female sexual activity by the New Haven Colony in 1656. 
 23. Statutes authorizing the death penalty for male-male anal intercourse were repealed in 
1861 in England, Ireland and Wales, and in 1889 in Scotland. See PAUL CRANE, GAYS AND THE 
LAW, 12 (London, Pluto Press, 1982). 
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and I’m grateful that most of Leviticus is ignored by Christians who 
otherwise take the texts of the Bible very seriously. Remember that 
Leviticus would also support the death penalty for cursing one of your 
parents, committing adultery, committing blasphemy (in which case you 
should be stoned by your congregation), or being a wizard: in each case, 
the guilty party “shall surely be put to death.”24 Leviticus is silent as to 
the penalty for breaching its injunction not to wear “a garment mingled 
of linen and woollen,” but authorizes “eye for eye, tooth for tooth” 
justice (e.g., the state may cut off the leg of a person convicted of 
causing the amputation of the leg of another).25
After the repeal of the death penalty for some or all forms of same-
sex sexual activity (which has still to take place in Afghanistan, Iran, 
Pakistan, Saudi Arabia and a few other Muslim-majority countries, as 
well as some states of Nigeria),26 a country, state or province can move 
on to steps (2), (3) and (4). The two tables of data in the handout (one for 
Europe and one for Canada and the U.S.) give the years in which various 
countries (or parts of countries) in Europe, provinces in Canada, or states 
in the U.S., have taken these steps.27 For Canada and the U.S., the step 
(2) year is the one in which private, consensual, adult same-sex sexual 
activity was decriminalized, whereas for Europe, it is the more 
significant year in which the age of consent to sexual activity was 
equalized for male-female, male-male and female-female sexual activity. 
After decriminalization, most European countries chose to continue to 
condemn and stigmatize same-sex sexual activity by imposing a higher 
age of consent. 
For Europe, Canada and the U.S., step (4) has been divided into five 
sub-steps: (a) allowing one same-sex partner to adopt the other partner’s 
child, i.e., second-parent adoption; (b) allowing a same-sex couple to 
adopt jointly a child who is not related to either partner; (c) allowing 
same-sex couples to register their relationships and acquire some of the 
rights and duties of married couples, without calling the registration a 
legal marriage; (d) allowing same-sex couples to register their 
relationships and acquire all of the rights and duties of married couples 
(except possibly in relation to adoption and medically assisted 
procreation), without calling the registration a legal marriage; and (e) 
allowing same-sex couples to contract legal marriages and acquire all of 
the rights and duties of married couples. Sub-steps (a) and (b) have 
 24. Leviticus 20: 9, 10, 27; 24: 16 (King James). 
 25. Id. at 19: 19; 24: 20. 
 26. See http://www.ilgaeurope.org/europe/publications/non_periodical/rights_not_crimes_ 
april_2005. 
 27. See Appendices A and B. 
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generally come before sub-steps (c), (d) and (e) in Canada and the U.S., 
because legislatures and courts often consider that the possibility of 
adoption by a same-sex couple is in the best interests of the child, even if 
the legislature or court is not yet ready to grant the child’s parents equal 
access to rights and duties as a couple. In Europe, the order has varied. In 
2003, Belgium introduced legal marriage for same-sex couples without 
the right to adopt a child jointly, whereas in 2002, Sweden, as well as 
England and Wales, introduced joint adoption by same-sex couples but 
continue to exclude them from legal marriage. However, as of April 20, 
2006, 9 countries28 in Europe had decided to allow joint and second-
parent adoption, or only second-parent adoption, but only 3 had granted 
equal access to legal marriage to same-sex couples. Thus, in Europe, 
Canada and the U.S., it can be said that equal access to legal marriage is 
legally and politically harder to achieve than equal access to joint 
adoption. However, there is one clear difference. In Canada, the U.S. and 
the United Kingdom, the most common order has been: (a)-(b) adoption 
rights; (c)-(d) a broader package of rights for same-sex couples; (e) equal 
access to legal marriage. In Continental Europe, the most common order 
has been: (c)-(d) a broad package of rights for same-sex couples 
(excluding adoption rights); (a)-(b) adoption rights; (e) equal access to 
legal marriage. 
The table on Canada and the U.S. allows you to see where Utah 
stands in relation to International Trend No. 2.29 Step (2), repeal of the 
criminal prohibition of same-sex or different-sex oral or anal intercourse 
(“sodomy”), was not taken voluntarily by the legislature or the courts in 
Utah, and had to be imposed by the U.S. Supreme Court in Lawrence v. 
Texas in 2003.30 In the case of different-race marriage, Utah acted 
voluntarily, albeit very late, repealing its ban31 only four years before the 
U.S. Supreme Court struck down the remaining state anti-miscegenation 
laws in Loving v. Virginia in 1967. Utah has yet to take step (3), passing 
a law prohibiting sexual orientation discrimination in employment or 
services, and steps (4)(a)-(e) do not seem imminent, in light of the 2004 
amendment to the Utah Constitution defining marriage as only between 
“a man and a woman.”32 Clearly there is a long way to go, but I would 
 28. The two countries not listed in Appendix A are Iceland and Norway. 
 29. See Appendix B. 
 30. 539 U.S. 558 (2003). 
 31. Utah Code Annotated s. 30-1-2, repealed in 1963, prohibited marriages: “(5) Between a 
negro and a white person. (6) Between a Mongolian, member of the Malay race or a mulatto, 
quadroon, or octoroon, and a white person.”
 32. Utah Constitution, Article I, Section 29 (added in 2004): “(1) Marriage consists only of 
the legal union between a man and a woman. (2) No other domestic union, however denominated, 
may be recognized as a marriage or given the same or substantially equivalent legal effect.” 
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argue that these steps are historically inevitable – it is therefore only a 
question of time before they will be taken in Utah, either voluntarily or 
involuntarily, as a result of the intervention of the U.S. Supreme Court or 
Congress. 
Turning to the topic of today’s symposium, if we look back five 
years to September 2000, no country in the world granted equal access to 
legal marriage to same-sex couples. This form of equality for the lesbian 
and gay minority that exists in every country is very new. But the 
number of countries that have decided to grant it, so as to eliminate the 
last major form of discrimination based on sexual orientation, is growing, 
slowly but steadily. The first country to do so was the Netherlands, in 
December 2000.33 In accordance with Dutch tradition regarding this kind 
of social issue, it was the legislature that took this step rather than the 
Dutch Supreme Court.34 The example of the Netherlands strongly 
influenced the legislature of its neighbor, Belgium, which adopted a 
similar law in 2003.35 Spain, which has taken human rights very 
seriously since the return of democracy in 1978 (after the death of the 
dictator Franco in 1975), built on a series of laws recognizing same-sex 
couples at the regional level by granting equal access to legal marriage 
and joint adoption in 2005.36 The fourth European country to open up 
 33. Act of 21 December 2000 amending Book 1 of the Civil Code, concerning the opening 
up of marriage for persons of the same sex (Act on the Opening Up of Marriage), Staatsblad 2001, 
nr. 9, http://athena.leidenuniv.nl/rechten/meijers/index.php3?m=10&c=86 (last visited May 8, 2006), 
in force 1 April 2001: Article 30: “1. A marriage can be contracted by two persons of different sex or 
of the same sex. 2. The law only considers marriage in its civil relations.” 
 34. Dutch courts do not have the power to strike down Acts of the Dutch Parliament that 
violate the equality provision of the Dutch Constitution. See Kees Waaldijk, Constitutional 
Protection Against Discrimination of Homosexuals, (1986-87) 13 JOURNAL OF HOMOSEXUALITY 57. 
They do have the power to strike down laws that violate an international human rights treaty, but the 
Dutch Supreme Court has been reluctant to depart from the case-law of the European Court of 
Human Rights with respect to the right to marry. And with respect to the right to be free from 
discrimination, the Dutch courts often refer controversial issues to Parliament, rather than find a 
violation of Article 14 of the European Convention on Human Rights, or of Article 26 of the 
International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights. Both these practices of judicial restraint led to 
the rejection, by the Dutch Supreme Court in 1990, of a claim by two women who wanted to marry 
each other. See Hoge Raad (Supreme Court), Oct. 19, 1990, [1992] Nederlandse Jurisprudentie, No. 
129; see also Kees Waaldijk, “How the Road to Same-Sex Marriage Got Paved in the Netherlands,” 
in LEGAL RECOGNITION OF SAME-SEX PARTNERSHIPS: A STUDY OF NATIONAL, EUROPEAN AND 
INTERNATIONAL LAW (Robert Wintemute ed., Oxford, Hart Publishing, 2001). 
 35. Law of 13 Feb. 2003 opening up marriage to persons of the same sex and modifying 
certain provisions of the Civil Code), Moniteur belge, 28 Feb. 2003, Edition 3, p. 9880, available at 
http://www.moniteur.be/index_fr.htm (last visited May 8, 2006), Moniteur belge, electronic item 
2003009163), in force 1 June 2003: Art. 143. – “Two persons of different sex or of the same sex 
may contract marriage.” 
 36. Law 13/2005, of 1 July, providing for the amendment of the Civil Code with regard to the 
right to contract marriage), Boletín Oficial del Estado no. 157, 2 July 2005, pp. 23632-23634, 
http://www.boe.es/boe/dias/2005-07-02/pdfs/A23632-23634.pdf (in force 3 July 2005): Article 44 
(new second para.): “Marriage shall have the same requirements and effects whether both parties are 
of the same or different sex.” 
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legal marriage to same-sex couples is likely to be Sweden, where a 
parliamentary commission of inquiry is currently studying the question.37
Unlike European countries, where courts have been reluctant to 
strike down laws excluding same-sex couples from legal marriage, and 
have left the question to the legislature,38 Canada and South Africa have 
new, but robust, traditions of judicial review of discriminatory laws 
under their constitutional bills of rights: the Canadian Charter of Rights 
and Freedoms, added to Canada’s federal Constitution in 1982;39 and the 
Bill of Rights in South Africa’s final Constitution, adopted in 199640. 
This judicial review has, to a large extent, been inspired by judicial 
review under the federal and state Constitutions in the U.S. 
In Canada in 2003, both the Ontario Court of Appeal41 and the 
British Columbia Court of Appeal42 held that that the common-law 
definition of marriage as between persons of different sexes constituted 
unjustifiable discrimination based on sexual orientation, contrary to 
Section 15(1), the equality provision of the Charter. To eliminate the 
discrimination, both courts reformulated the common-law definition of 
marriage as being the union of “two persons.” Unlike the Supreme 
Judicial Court of Massachusetts in Goodridge, both courts gave 
immediate effect to their judgments, and ordered that marriage licenses 
be issued to same-sex couples from the dates of the judgments. Same-sex 
couples began to marry in Ontario and British Columbia, and in other 
provinces and territories as a result of trial court decisions adopting the 
same reasoning, which the federal government did not appeal. However, 
without a decision of the Supreme Court of Canada, or an Act of the 
federal Parliament,43 the legal validity of these marriages was not entirely 
 37. See http://www.homo.se/o.o.i.s/1820 (last visited May 8, 2006). 
 38. See, e.g., Netherlands, Hoge Raad (Supreme Court), Oct. 19, 1990, [1992] Nederlandse 
Jurisprudentie, No. 129l; Germany, Bundesverfassungsgericht (Federal Constitutional Court), 4 Oct. 
4, 1993), [1993] Neue Juristische Wochenschrift 3058; Spain, Tribunal Constitucional 
(Constitutional Court), Auto TC 222/1994 (July 11, 1994); Constitutional Court of Hungary (13 March 
1995), 14/1995 (III.13.) AB határozat; see László Sólyom & Georg Brunner, Constitutional 
Judiciary in a New Democracy: The Hungarian Constitutional Court (Ann Arbor, Univ. of 
Michigan Press, 2000), at 316-21. 
 39. Part I of the Constitution Act, 1982, enacted as Schedule B to the Canada Act 1982 (Acts 
of the United Kingdom Parliament, 1982, chapter 11). 
 40. CONSTITUTION OF THE REPUBLIC OF SOUTH AFRICA ACT (No. 108 of 1996), Chapter 2. 
 41. See Halpern v. Att’y Gen. (Canada), [2003] 65 O.R.3d 161. 
 42. See Barbeau v. Att’y Gen. (British Columbia), [2003] 228 D.L.R. 416, 2003 B.C.C.A. 
251; see also Barbeau v. Att’y Gen. (British Columbia), [2003] 225 D.L.R. 472, 2003 B.C.C.A. 406. 
 43. In Canada, as in the United States., most family law is under the jurisdiction of the 
provinces and territories. However, unlike in the United States, there is an exception for “marriage” 
(which has been interpreted as meaning capacity to marry) and “divorce,” which fall within the 
jurisdiction of the federal Parliament. See Constitution Act, 1867, s. 91(26). This means that equal 
access to legal marriage for same-sex couples in Canada has been, and remains, a federal question, 
which must be answered in the same way for the entire country at the same time. The state-by-state 
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certain. 
In 2003, the federal Government decided not to appeal the Ontario 
and British Columbia decisions, and instead to refer a bill that would 
allow same-sex couples to marry to the Supreme Court of Canada, with 
questions about the bill’s constitutionality.44 In 2004, the Court held that 
the federal Parliament has the constitutional power to pass the bill 
(Parliament may pass it), but refused to say whether the equality 
provision of the Charter requires the bill (whether Parliament must pass 
it).45 In 2005, the federal Parliament passed the bill,46 and therefore 
clearly authorized legal marriages by same-sex couples in all ten 
provinces and three territories. The only remaining uncertainty is 
whether the federal Parliament could constitutionally repeal the 2005 
legislation, without invoking Section 33(1) of the Charter, which permits 
temporary (five-year) overrides of certain Charter rights, and has never 
been used by the federal Parliament. Canadian legal academics 
overwhelming support the view that the Supreme Court of Canada would 
(in an appropriate case) interpret Section 15(1) of the Charter as 
requiring equal access to legal marriage for same-sex couples, and 
therefore that the 2005 legislation could not be repealed without invoking 
Section 33(1).47 Because capacity to marry is a federal question in 
Canada, no province or territory may opt out of the 2005 legislation. I am 
from Alberta, Canada’s most conservative province, where the 
legislature is as eager as the Utah legislature (and electorate) to exclude 
same-sex couples from legal marriage. However, the Alberta 
legislature’s attempt to do so in 2000 was clearly beyond its 
constitutional powers.48
In South Africa, applying the express prohibition of sexual 
orientation discrimination in the 1996 Constitution, the Constitutional 
Court has developed what is probably the strongest case-law in the world 
in relation to discrimination against same-sex couples.49 In 2004, the 
changes to marriage law that are necessary in the United States are not possible in Canada. 
 44. See Robert Wintemute, Sexual Orientation and the Charter: The Achievement of Formal 
Legal Equality (1985-2005) and Its Limits, 49 MCGILL L.J. 1143 (2004), available at 
http://www.journal.law.mcgill.ca/abs/vol49/4winte.html (last visited May 8, 2006). Canadian 
governments may submit hypothetical questions to the Supreme Court. 
 45. See Reference re Same-Sex Marriage, [2004] 3 S.C.R. 698. 
 46. Civil Marriage Act, 2005 S.C., ch. 33, § 2 (Can.) (“Marriage, for civil purposes, is the 
lawful union of two persons to the exclusion of all others.”). 
 47. See http://www.equal-marriage.ca/resource.php?id=143 (last visited May 8, 2006). 
 48. See Marriage Act, Revised Statutes of Alberta, c. M-5, as amended by Marriage 
Amendment Act, 2000, Statutes of Alberta 2000, c. 3: s. 1(c.) (“marriage” means a marriage 
between a man and a woman); s. 1.1 (“This Act operates notwithstanding (a) the provisions of 
sections 2 and 7 to 15 of the Canadian Charter . . . .” [an invalid attempt to invoke Section 33(1) of 
the Charter to insulate the legislation from judicial review]). 
 49. See http://www.constitutionalcourt.org.za/site/home.htm (last visited May 8, 2006): Case 
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Supreme Court of Appeal applied this case-law to the common-law 
definition of marriage, and concluded that the exclusion of same-sex 
couples was discrimination violating the 1996 Constitution.50 This 
judgment has been appealed, but I would be very surprised if the 
Constitutional Court did not reach the same conclusion as the Supreme 
Court of Appeal.51
By Dec. 1, 2006, after only six years, we will have gone from no 
countries granting equal access to legal marriage to same-sex couples to 
five countries granting such access (the Netherlands, Belgium, Spain, 
Canada, and South Africa), along with Massachusetts. Outside the 
United States, are there any attempts to prevent the culmination of 
International Trend No. 2 (eliminating the last major form of sexual 
orientation discrimination, the exclusion of same-sex couples from legal 
marriage) through constitutional amendments, such as the proposed 
“Federal Marriage Protection Amendment” in the United States? I would 
suggest that the countries the United States should compare itself with 
are a group of 32 other democracies with good records of protecting 
human rights (and combined populations of around 560,000,000, or 
nearly double that of the United States): the 25 member states of 
European Union,52 Iceland, Norway, Switzerland, Canada, South Africa, 
Australia and New Zealand. It is easy to browse through the constitutions 
of the other 158 or so member states of the United Nations and find 
examples of “one man and one woman” definitions of marriage. 
However, many of these countries have, by the standards of the United 
No. CCT10/99, National Coalition for Gay & Lesbian Equality v. Minister of Home Affairs (Dec. 2, 
1999) (unmarried same-sex partners entitled to same immigration rights as married different-sex 
partners); Case Nos. CCT45/01, CCT48/02, Satchwell v. President of Republic of South Africa (July 
25, 2002; March 17, 2003) (unmarried same-sex partners of judges entitled to same employment 
benefits as married different-sex partners); Case No. CCT40/01, Suzanne Du Toit & Anna-Marie De 
Vos v. Minister for Welfare and Population Development (Sept. 10, 2002) (unmarried same-sex 
partners cannot be excluded from the right of married different-sex partners to adopt children 
jointly); Case No. CCT46/02, J. & B. v. Director General, Department of Home Affairs (March 28, 
2003) (unmarried lesbian partners cannot be excluded from the right of married different-sex 
partners to both be registered as the parents of a child born to the wife after donor insemination). 
 50. Case No. 232/2003, Fourie v. Minister of Home Affairs (Supreme Court of Appeal Nov. 
30, 2004), para. 49, http://www.law.wits.ac.za/sca/index.php (declaring with immediate effect that 
“the common law concept of marriage is developed to embrace same-sex partners as follows: 
‘Marriage is the union of two persons to the exclusion of all others for life,’” but leaving a statutory 
obstacle to legal marriage for same-sex couples in place). 
 51. The Constitutional Court agreed with the Supreme Court of Appeal in Case nos. 
CCT60/04, CCT10/05, Minister of Home Affairs v. Fourie, Lesbian and Gay Equality Project v. 
Minister of Home Affairs (Constitutional Court Dec. 1, 2005), http://www.constitutionalcourt.org.za 
/Archimages/5257.PDF. The Court’s order (at para. 162) gives the South African Parliament until 
Dec. 1 , 2006 to pass legislation allowing same-sex couples to marry. If Parliament fails to act, the 
Court’s judgment will take effect and the changes to the the Marriage Act (No. 25 of 1961), 
necessary to allow same-sex couples to marry, will be “read in,” from Dec. 1, 2006. 
 52. See http://www.europa.eu.int (last visited May 8, 2006). 
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States and the 32 other countries mentioned above, relatively weak 
democracies and relatively poor records of protecting human rights.53
Among the 32 democracies mentioned above,54 I found only one 
example55 of a constitution in which marriage is clearly defined as 
different-sex only, thereby preventing either the legislature or the courts 
from granting equal access to legal marriage to same-sex couples. This 
example appears in the 1997 Constitution of Poland,56 a country the laws 
of which are now heavily influenced by the Roman Catholic Church. 
Australia has a federal law similar to the U.S. Defense of Marriage Act, 
but which could be repealed tomorrow, because it is an ordinary statute 
of the federal (Commonwealth) Parliament and not a part of the 
Australian Constitution.57
In most of these 32 democracies, the national or federal constitution 
contains no definition of marriage, leaving it up to the legislature to grant 
equal access to legal marriage to same-sex couples, or to the courts to 
interpret the constitution’s equality clause as requiring equal access. Both 
the legislature and the courts are free to do so in accordance with 
changing social conditions, and are not required to wait for a 
constitutional definition of marriage to be repealed or struck down by a 
higher authority. In a few countries, such as Spain, the constitution 
contains an ambiguous reference to “man and woman” but does not say 
that marriage is only between “a man and a woman.”58 In a pending case, 
the Constitutional Court of Spain is likely to interpret this provision as 
 53. For example, the Constitution of Uganda was amended in 2005 to read: “it is unlawful for 
same-sex couples to marry.” See http://www.365gay.com/newscon05/09/093005uganda.htm (last 
visited May 8, 2006). See also the (non-constitutional) bill before the Parliament of Nigeria, where 
same-sex sexual activity is already criminalized. The bill (introduced in response to the Dec. 1, 2005 
judgment of the Constitutional Court of South Africa) goes well beyond defining marriage as only 
between “a man and a woman.” The bill will make it an offense, punishable by up to five years in 
prison, to be a party to, perform, witness, aid or abet a same-sex marriage, or to be involved in “the 
registration of gay clubs, societies and organizations, . . . procession or meetings.” See 
http://okrasoup.typepad.com/black_looks/files/nigeria_gay_bill.pdf (last visited May 8, 2006) 
(clauses 7-8). 
 54. Data for the survey is available at http://confinder.richmond.edu (last visited May 8, 
2006). 
 55. A second example was approved by the Parliament of Latvia on Dec. 15, 2005. Amended 
Article 110 of the Latvian Constitution now reads: “The State protects and support marriage – a 
union between a man and a woman . . . .” See http://www.ilga-europe.org/europe/media/latvia_ 
cements_homophobia_in_the_constitution. 
 56. “Marriage, being a union of a man and a woman . . . shall be placed under the protection 
and care of the Republic of Poland.” POLAND CONST. art. 18 (1997) (emphasis added) available at 
http://poland.pl/info/information_about_poland/constitution/ch1.htm (last visited May 8, 2006). 
 57. Marriage Amendment Act, 2004 (No. 126 of 2004), available at http://www.austlii.edu. 
au/au/legis/cth/num_act/maa2004n1262004192 (last visited May 8, 2006).  
 58. See SPAIN CONST. art. XXXII, § 1 available at http://www.constitucion.es/constitucion 
/lenguas/ingles.html (May 8, 2006) (1978) ([Marriage, Matrimonial Equality]: “Man [el hombre] and 
woman [la mujer] have the right to contract matrimony with full legal equality”). 
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permitting the 2005 legislation that allowed same-sex couples to marry, 
and to remain silent on whether the equality clause of the Spanish 
Constitution required the legislation. Some international human rights 
treaties refer in a similarly ambiguous way to “men and women,” but do 
not say that a man may only marry a woman and that a woman may only 
marry a man. Both Article 12 of the European Convention on Human 
Rights, and Article 23(2) of the International Covenant on Civil and 
Political Rights, refer to the right to marry of “men and women of 
marriageable age.” The European Court of Human Rights has interpreted 
Article 12 as no longer requiring two persons of opposite biological 
(chromosomal) sex, in the case of a post-operative male-to-female 
transsexual person who sought to marry a non-transsexual man,59 but has 
yet to consider the proposed marriage of two non-transsexual men or two 
non-transsexual women. The United Nations Human Rights Committee 
has considered such a case and concluded that Article 23(2) does not yet 
protect the right of a same-sex couple to marry.60 It is important to note 
that neither Article 12 nor Article 23(2) has been interpreted as 
precluding a country that has ratified either treaty from voluntarily 
deciding to allow same-sex couples to marry. Article 9 (right to marry) 
of the Charter of Fundamental Rights of the European Union deletes the 
reference to “men and women.” The official comment on Article 9 
makes it clear that it is for each member state of the European Union to 
decide whether or not to allow same-sex couples to marry.61
It will come as no surprise that I am opposed to the proposed 
“Federal Marriage Protection Amendment,” because I think that same-
sex couples should be granted equal access to legal marriage in Utah and 
 59. Christine Goodwin v. United Kingdom (July 11, 2002), http://www.echr.coe.int 
(HUDOC) (last visited May 8, 2006). 
 60. See International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights art. 23,§ 2, Dec.16 1966, 
available at http://www.unhchr.ch/html/menu3/b/a_ccpr.htm (last visited May 8, 2006) (“The right 
of men and women of marriageable age to marry and to found a family shall be recognized”); Joslin 
v. New Zealand (Communication No. 902/1999), U.N. Hum. Rts. Comm. ¶ 8.2 (July 17, 2002), 
available at http://www.unhchr.ch/tbs/doc.nsf (last visited May 8, 2006) (stating same-sex marriage 
not required because “the treaty obligation of States parties stemming from article 23, paragraph 2, 
of the [ICCPR] is to recognize as marriage only the union between a man and a woman wishing to 
marry each other”). 
 61. See Charter of Fundamental Rights of the European Union ch. 1, art. IX (European 
Commission, Dec. 7, 2000), available at http://ue.eu.int/uedocs/cms_data/docs/2004/4/29 
/Explanation%20relating%20to%20the%20complete%20text%20of%20the%20charter.pdf (last 
visited May 8, 2006). Article 9 provides: “The right to marry and the right to found a family shall be 
guaranteed in accordance with the national laws governing the exercise of these rights.” The official 
comment on the text states: “The wording of the Article has been modernised to cover cases in 
which national legislation recognises arrangements other than marriage for founding a family. This 
Article neither prohibits nor imposes the granting of the status of marriage to unions between people 
of the same sex. This right is thus similar to that afforded by the [European Convention on Human 
Rights], but its scope may be wider when national legislation so provides.” 
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every other state in the United States. I would put the proposed 
amendment in the same category as other unwise federal constitutional 
amendments that have never been adopted: 
 
• Federal Protection of Democracy Amendment – “Only men 
shall be entitled to vote in the United States.” 
 
• Federal Protection of Religion Amendment – 
“Notwithstanding the First Amendment, the only religion 
that may be practiced in the United States is Christianity, 
which does not include the Church of Jesus Christ of Latter-
day Saints.” 
 
• Federal Protection of White Supremacy Amendment (1955 
version, seeking to prevent Loving v. Virginia in 1967): 
“Marriage in the United States is the union of two persons of 
the same race.” 
 
Indeed, I would suggest that a more accurate name for the proposed 
amendment would be the “Federal Protection of Heterosexual 
Supremacy Amendment.” Please note that I am not opposed to 
constitutional amendments that overturn decisions of courts. I think that 
such amendments are a legitimate part of the democratic process, but that 
members of the majority (in this case the heterosexual majority) should 
think long and hard before they entrench discrimination against a 
minority (in this case the lesbian and gay minority). Constitutions should 
be difficult to amend. The Utah Constitution, for example, is much too 
easy to amend, given that the 2004 amendment defining marriage as 
different-sex only62 took less than one year. This does not give the 
majority sufficient time to reflect before entrenching discrimination 
against a minority. 
The arguments against equal access to legal marriage for same-sex 
couples are astonishingly weak. They can be summarized as follows: 
 
1.  (the heterosexual majority’s) tradition (“it’s always been this                   
            way”); 
 
2.  religious objections (“not in my church/synagogue/mosque”); 
3.  marriage is for procreation (“Adam and Eve, not Adam and 
            Steve”); 
 62. Utah Constitution, Article I, Section 29. 
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4.  slippery slope (“what about incest and polygamy?”); 
 
5.  devaluation of marriage for different-sex couples (“get your own  
            institution”); and 
 
6.  same-sex couples will become the majority (“they will take  
            over!”). 
 
These arguments are easily rebutted: (1) slavery and men-only elections 
were traditions; (2) equal access to legal marriage does not mean equal 
access to religious marriage (freedom of religion will protect the right of 
individual religious institutions to decide whether or not to marry same-
sex couples); (3) no different-sex couple is ever asked to prove their 
desire or capacity to procreate prior to being issued a marriage license;63 
(4) incest and polygamy are entirely separate issues, which couples 
consisting of two unrelated men or two unrelated women seeking to 
marry are not raising; (5) legal marriage is a public institution which 
should be open to everyone; and (6) same-sex couples are likely always 
to be a small minority, because it is not discriminatory laws that make 
heterosexual people heterosexual (it is likely that members of the 
heterosexual majority have as little control over their sexual orientations 
as members of the lesbian and gay minority have over theirs). 
I would like to conclude with a few more personal notes, and a 
comment on the majority position in Utah, which opposes equal access to 
marriage for same-sex couples. A theme that I developed briefly in 
Dublin in April 2005, when I last saw Professor Lynn Wardle was the 
question of lack of empathy on the part of the heterosexual majority, 
which I think is an important reason why many heterosexual people do 
not reconsider their position on same-sex marriage. I think that 
heterosexual people really have to try to put themselves in the position of 
a lesbian woman or gay man. Imagine waking up tomorrow in a society 
with a lesbian and gay majority, in which heterosexuals are a minority of 
2 to 10 percent. You are told that even though you are a man who is 
attracted to women, falls in love with women, and wants to spend his life 
 63. The European Court of Human Rights rejected the “procreative capacity argument” in 
Christine Goodwin v. United Kingdom (July 11, 2002), para. 98, http://www.echr.coe.int (HUDOC) 
(last visited May 8, 2006), in which the male-to-female transsexual applicant was sterile: 
“Reviewing the situation in 2002, the Court observes that Article 12 [of the European Convention on 
Human Rights] secures the fundamental right of a man and woman to marry and to found a family. 
The second aspect is not however a condition of the first and the inability of any couple to conceive 
or parent a child cannot be regarded as per se removing their right to enjoy the first limb of this 
provision.” 
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with a particular woman, you must fight these impulses and seek 
treatment, because your feelings are wrong, immoral, and sinful. You 
must marry another man, because that is what is right for the majority of 
men (who are gay), whether or not it is right for you. Heterosexual 
women are told the same thing. In addition to thinking about what it 
would be like if the majority and minority positions were reversed, 
heterosexual people could also think about what it is like to be lesbian or 
gay. It is very easy. A heterosexual woman need only think about the 
good feelings of love and physical attraction and pleasure she can 
experience with a man. A lesbian woman experiences exactly the same 
feelings with another woman. And a gay man experiences exactly the 
same feelings with another man as a heterosexual man does with a 
woman. Why would you want to deny expression of these very positive 
feelings to one of your fellow human beings? 
Apart from failing to engage their capacity for empathy, are people 
who are opposed to same-sex marriage “homophobic,” i.e., hostile to or 
prejudiced against lesbian and gay people? Given that same-sex marriage 
is such a recent development, available in only one of fifty states in the 
United States and (from Dec. 1, 2006) in only 5 of the 32 other 
democracies I mentioned above, I would say a heterosexual person can, 
in good faith and without being homophobic, oppose equal access to 
legal marriage (and joint adoption) for same-sex couples, because these 
are novel ideas with which they are not yet comfortable. However, the 
non-homophobic heterosexual opponent of same-sex marriage (and joint 
adoption) should be otherwise in favor of legal equality for lesbian and 
gay individuals. They should oppose criminalization of private, adult, 
consensual, same-sex sexual activity, and support legislation prohibiting 
discrimination based on sexual orientation against lesbian and gay 
individuals (if not yet same-sex couples) in access to employment, 
housing, education and other services. If, unlike the non-homophobic 
heterosexual person, you basically dislike same-sex sexual activity and 
couple relationships, think that they are wrong, immoral, evil, etc., 
actively supported the “sodomy” law in Utah when it was on the statute 
book, or did nothing to help repeal it, and are opposed to or are doing 
nothing to support a bill that would protect lesbian women and gay men 
in Utah against discrimination in employment , etc., then I would say: 
“Yes, you are homophobic!”64
Is it permissible for a Christian to say “I love the sinner (the lesbian 
woman or gay man), but I hate his or her sin (same-sex sexual activity 
 64. See Russell Shorto, What’s Their Real Problem with Gay Marriage? (It’s the Gay Part), 
NEW YORK TIMES SUNDAY MAGAZINE, June 19, 2005. 
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and couple relationships)”? Imagine if I were to say: “I have nothing 
against Mormons. I think that they are wonderful people, and I respect 
them, as long as they do not practice their religion.” If I were to say this, 
then I think that most of you would say that I was anti-Mormon. That is 
certainly not the case that I am anti-Mormon. I perfectly respect the right 
of Mormons to practice their religion. What I do not accept is anyone, 
from any religion, telling me how I should live my life, in relation to my 
sexual orientation. I accept and respect your religion. All I ask is that you 
accept and respect my sexual orientation.65
I would like to thank Professor Lynn Wardle for inviting me to speak 
at this conference. As an openly gay man, I do not feel welcome in Utah, 
and I hesitated to come. When I arrived in Salt Lake City, the first place I 
visited was one where I felt welcome—it was not Temple Square. 
Rather, it was the Gay, Lesbian, Bisexual and Transgender Community 
Center of Utah,66 where I purchased this souvenir running tank top: 
“Utah Pride 2005:67 Equal Rights–No More No Less.” 
I think it is a good idea for Brigham Young University to invite more 
openly lesbian and gay speakers,68 because there is a desperate need for 
more contact between openly lesbian and gay people and religious 
communities. This will help members of religious communities to realize 
that lesbian women and gay men are not such bad people, and that we 
should be allowed to lead our lives as we see fit. Referring to my own 
life, I enjoyed a loving relationship for fifteen years with my male 
partner, until he decided to end our relationship in September 2004. I 
hope to find love again with another man, and perhaps to get married 
now that it is legally possible. My eighty-year-old mother has waited a 
long time and would be very pleased. The wedding could now take place 
in my home city of Calgary, and even at the Woodcliff United Church 
where I attended kindergarten. The United Church of Canada is the 
largest Protestant denomination in Canada. Legal same-sex marriages 
have been possible in United Churches, depending on the policy of each 
congregation, since 2003.69 Would a few same-sex couples from Salt 
 65. See Robert Wintemute, “Sexual Orientation and the Charter: The Achievement of Formal 
Legal Equality (1985-2005) and Its Limits,” (2004) 49 MCGILL L.J. 1143, available at 
http://www.journal.law.mcgill.ca/abs/vol49/4winte.html (last visited May 8, 2006). 
 66. See http://www.glbtccu.org. 
 67. See http://www.utahpride.org. 
 68. See BYU, U. of U. Ranked Low in Acceptance of Queer Students, SALT LAKE METRO, 
Sept. 1, 2005, at 10 (Princeton Review ranks BYU 352nd of 361 U.S. universities and colleges for 
acceptance of lesbian and gay people). 
 69. See Information sheet on covenant of marriage, United Church of Canada, available at 
http://www.united-church.ca/moderator/short/2003/1008c (38th General Council, 2003: “The United 
Church of Canada resolved to call upon the Government of Canada to recognize same-sex marriage 
in the marriage legislation.”). 
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Lake City like to join me?70 I would point out, on behalf of the Calgary 
tourism officials, that Calgary is currently the closest city for same-sex 
couples in Utah who would like to get married— only a two-hour flight 
to the north. I am sure that you can get attractive honeymoon packages at 
the Banff Springs and Chateau Lake Louise Hotels. 
The position of the United Church of Canada is the one I hope that 
all religious institutions will reach eventually. At its 37th General 
Council in 2000, the Church affirmed that “human sexual relations, 
whether heterosexual or homosexual, are a gift from God and part of the 
marvellous diversity of creation.”71 I certainly consider my own capacity 
to feel sexually attracted to other men, to experience sexual pleasure with 
other men, and to fall in love with other men, as a gift from God. I would 
say to opponents of same-sex marriage, and supporters of the “Federal 
Marriage Protection Amendment,” with the greatest respect, that despite 
your good intentions, you have made a mistake on this issue. I would 
urge you to accept this mistake, to stop opposing legal equality for 
lesbian and gay individuals and same-sex couples, and to find a genuine 
social problem, such as racism or poverty, in the United States or the 
developing world, to which you could devote your time, energy, and 
money. Working to make life more difficult for your fellow human 
beings who are lesbian and gay is not something of which your 
grandchildren, or your grandnephews and grandnieces, will be proud. I 
am glad to see that, in the Dutch Reformed Church in South Africa, the 
leadership has realized the mistake they made by supporting 
discrimination against lesbian and gay people.72
Same-sex marriage is coming to Utah. The “Federal Marriage 
Protection Amendment” will never be adopted. The U.S. Supreme Court 
will invalidate the remaining anti-same-sex marriage constitutional 
amendments sometime between 2022 and 2045, which is between 19 and 
42 years from the 2003 decision of the Supreme Judicial Court of 
Massachusetts in Goodridge.73 The period of 19 years represents the gap 
between two decisions on laws banning different-race marriage: the 
Perez74 decision of the Supreme Court of California in 1948, striking 
 70. If they are Mormon, they could face disciplinary action. See “Mormon in Legal Gay 
Marriage [in Toronto] Faces Expulsion” (March 15, 2006), available at 
http://www.365gay.com/Newscon06/03/031506mormon.htm (last visited May 8, 2006). 
 71. See id. 
 72. See Dutch Reformed Church’s statement, available at http://www.365gay.com 
/newscon04/11/112204safChurch.htm (last visted May 8, 2006): “We would like to ask forgiveness 
for the pain and suffering that we caused you and your families in the past. We accept that what we 
did in the past was wrong.” 
 73. Goodridge v. Department of Public Health, 798 N.E.2d 941 (Mass. 2003). 
 74. Perez v. Lippold, 198 P.2d 17 (Cal. 1948). 
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down California’s law, and the Loving75 decision of the U.S. Supreme 
Court in 1967, striking down all remaining laws of this kind. The period 
of 42 years represents the gap between the first repeal of a “sodomy” law 
(in Illinois in 1961), and the Lawrence76 decision of the U.S. Supreme 
Court in 2003, striking down all remaining laws of this kind. Once same-
sex couples are able to marry in Utah, perhaps my future spouse and I 
will, if we live that long, come to Utah to renew our vows. Thank you. 
 75. Loving v. Virginia, 388 U.S. 1 (1967). 
 76. Lawrence v. Texas, 539 U.S. 558 (2003). 
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Appendix A: 
Progression To Same-Sex Marriage In The First  
15 European Union Member States 
(Year The Law Was Enacted) 
 
Member State 
Note: dates not 
available for 
all Member 
States for step 
(1), repeal of 
death penalty 



























































Spain 1988 1995 2005 2005 1998-
200379  
2005 2005 
Netherlands 1971 1991 2000 200080 1997 1997 2000 
Sweden 1978 1987 2002 2002 1994 1994 committee 
UK 2000 2003 200281 2002 2004 2004 ——— 
Belgium 1985 2003 200582 2005 1998 2003 2003 
Denmark 1976 1987 1999 ——— 1989 1989 ——— 
Finland 1998 1995 ——— ——— 2001 2001 ——— 
Germany 1994 2003 2004 ——— 2001 ——— ——— 
France 1982 1985 ——— ——— 1999 ——— ——— 
Luxembourg 1992 1997 ——— ——— 2004 ——— ——— 
Portugal exceptions 2003 ——— ——— 200183  ——— ——— 
Ireland exceptions 1993 ——— ——— ——— ——— ——— 
Italy 1889 2003 ——— ——— ——— ——— ——— 
Austria 2002 2003 ——— ——— ——— ——— ——— 
Greece exceptions 2003 ——— ——— ——— ——— ——— 
 77. National legislation Directive 2000/78/EC (in force 2 Dec. 2003). 
 78. Perhaps excluding certain parental rights (adoption, medically assisted procreation). 
 79. Laws in the comunidades autónomas (regions). 
 80. The Netherlands plan to remove the exception for intercountry adoption in 2006 or 2007. 
 81. Adoption and Children Act 2002; England and Wales only; in force on 30 Dec. 2005; 
proposed for Scotland (second-parent and joint adoption. 
 82. See http://www.senat.be: Projet de loi modifiant certaines dispositions du Code civil en 
vue de permettre l’adoption par des personnes de même sexe (Bill to modify certain provisions of the 
Civil Code to permit adoption by persons of the same sex), passed by the House of Representatives 
on Dec. 1, 2005, and by the Senate on April 20, 2006 (second-parent and joint adoption). 
 83. Recognition of de facto cohabitation; there is no register. 
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Appendix B: 
Progression To Same-Sex Marriage In Selected  
Canadian Provinces and U.S. States 
























































Québec 1969 1977 1991 1991  2002 2002 200484
Ontario 1969 1986 1995 1995 2003 2003 2003 
British 
Columbia  
1969 1992 1995 1995 2003 2003 2003 
Massachus
etts 
197485 1989 1993 1993 2003 2003 200386
Vermont 1977 1991 1993 1993 1999/200087 1999/2000 ——— 
Connecticu
t 
1969 1991 2000 2000 2005 2005 ——— 
California 1975 1992 2003 2003 1999 200388 ——— 
New York 1980 200289 1995 1995 ——— ——— ——— 
Texas 200390 ——— ——— ——— ——— ——— ——— 
Florida 2003 ——— ———91 ——— ——— ——— ——— 
Mississippi 2003 ——— ———92 ——— ——— ——— ——— 
Utah 2003 ——— ———93 ——— ——— ——— ——— 
 
 
 84. The 2003 and 2004 judgments of the Courts of Appeal of Ontario, British Columbia and 
Québec were extended to all 10 provinces and 3 territories by the federal Civil Marriage Act in 2005. 
 85. Invalid as applied to “consensual conduct in private between adults.” See Commonwealth 
v. Balthazar, 318 N.E.2d 478 (Mass. 1974), as clarified by Gay & Lesbian Advocates & Defenders 
v. Attorney General, 763 N.E.2d 38 (Mass. 2002). 
 86. State recognition of same-sex couples generally does not apply at the federal level. 
 87. Vermont Supreme Court in 1999, legislature in 2000. 
 88. Some exceptions, e.g., with regard to state taxation. 
 89. But legislation was passed by New York City in 1986. 
 90. Lawrence v. Texas, 539 U.S. 558 (2003). 
 91. See Florida Statutes ch. 63.042, s. 3 (added in 1977): “No person eligible to adopt under 
this statute may adopt if that person is a homosexual.” 
 92. See Mississippi Code Annotated, § 93-17-3(2) (added in 2000), which provides that 
“[a]doption by couples of the same gender is prohibited.” 
 93. Utah expressly bans individual adoption by “a person who is cohabiting [residing with 
another person and being involved in a sexual relationship with that person] in a relationship that is 
not a legally valid and binding marriage under the laws of this state.” See Utah Code Annotated ss. 
78-30-1(3)(b), 78-30-9(3) (added in 2000). 
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Appendix C:  
Overview Of International Trend: Legal  
Recognition Of Same-Sex Couples 
 
Level of recognition 
of same-sex couples 
Separate institution for same-sex couples 
(X = also for a few different-sex couples) 
Institution open to all couples, different-sex 
or same-sex 
1)  Legal marriage 
(but * = no federal 
recognition yet) 
 - Netherlands (2000, in force in 2001) 
- Belgium (2003) 
- Canada (Ontario, British Columbia in 2003; 
federal legislation for all provinces/territories in 
2005) 
- Massachusetts, since May 17, 2004* 
- Spain (2005) 
- South Africa (from Dec. 1, 2006) 
- Sweden (2007?) 
(2)  Alternative 
registration system 
(a) package of 
rights/duties equal or 
almost equal to legal 
marriage 
(but * = no federal 
recognition yet) 
 
separate but mostly equal 
- Denmark (registered partnership) 
- Finland (registered partnership) 
- Iceland (confirmed cohabitation) 
- Norway (registered partnership) 
- Sweden (registered partnership) 
- Switzerland (registered partnership) 
- United Kingdom (civil partnership) 
- USA (California)*X (domestic partnership) 
- USA (Connecticut)* (civil union) 
- USA (Vermont)* (civil union) 
not separate and mostly equal 
- Australia (Tasmania)* (registered deed of 
relationship) 
- Canada (Québec) (civil union) 
- Netherlands (registered partnership) 
- New Zealand (civil union) 
 
(b)  package of 
rights/duties 
substantially inferior 
to legal marriage 
(and * = no federal 
recognition yet) 
separate and clearly unequal 
- Czech Republic (registered partnership) 
- Germany (problem in Bundesrat) (registered life 
partnership) 
- Switzerland (Zürich)* (registered partnership) 
- USA (Hawaii)*X (reciprocal beneficiaries) 
- USA (New Jersey)*X (domestic partnership) 
 
not separate but clearly unequal 
- Andorra (stable unions of couples) 
- Argentina (Buenos Aires)* 
- Belgium (statutory cohabitation) 
- Canada (Alberta, Manitoba, Nova Scotia) 
- France (pacte civil de solidarité) 
- Luxembourg (déclaration de partenariat) 
- Spain (laws in at least 12 of 17 regions) 
- Switzerland (Geneva, Neuchâtel)* 
- USA (District of Columbia and many cities)* 
(domestic partnership) 




greatly, but is often 
substantially inferior 




must be satisfied) 
 
examples: 
- UK (former rule: immigration for partners legally 
unable to marry) (mainly same-sex) 
- USA (some public and private sector employers’ 
benefit plans only recognize same-sex partners 
unable to marry and not unmarried different-sex 
partners of employees) 
examples: 
- Australia (most states/territories but generally 
not federal level) 
- Canada (federal level and most 
provinces/territories) 
- Croatia 
- France (concubinage) 
- Hungary 
- Netherlands 
- New Zealand 
- Portugal 
- Slovenia 
- South Africa 
- Sweden 
- United Kingdom 
 
